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1. INTRODUCTION
The service-oriented infrastructure has become popular for col-
laboratively mining data distributed over organizations [3], where
the participants are the data providers who submit their perturbed
datasets to the designated data mining service provider (the data
miner) for mining commonly interested models. Figure 1 shows
the service-oriented framework for collaborative multiparty data
mining. Two kinds of parties are directly involved in the comput-
ing. The mining service provider (SP) is a party independent of the
data providers, which owns abundant computing power, data min-
ing tools and talents. SP offers their data mining services to the
contracted parties through certain service provision scheme. We
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assume a semi-honest model for all parties. Therefore, we do not
consider the scenarios where either the data miner or some data
providers are malicious and can collude with one another. We also
assume that encryption is applied before data is transmitted on the
network. In this paper, we will study the problem of privacy pre-
serving multiparty collaborative data classification usinggeometric
data perturbation.
Geometric data perturbation has unique benefits for privacy pre-
serving data classification [1, 2]. First, many popular classifiers,
such as linear classifiers and Support Vector Machine (SVM), are
invariant to geometric transformation in the sense that the classi-
fiers trained with the perturbed data through geometric rotations
have almost the same accuracy as those trained with the original
raw data. Second, geometric data perturbation can easily produce
multiple random transformations, each of which preserves classi-
fication model accuracy for the discussed classifiers. Thus, an in-
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dividual data provider needs only to select one perturbation that
can provide satisfactory privacy guarantee. A randomized pertur-
bation optimization algorithm is also developed in previous work
[2] to provide high privacy guarantee with high probability (Figure
2). Comparing with other existing approaches to privacy preserv-
ing classification, geometric data perturbation significantly reduces
the complexity in balancing data utility and data privacy guarantee.
The key challenge for applying geometric data perturbation to
multiparty collaborative data classification is to unify the pertur-
bations used by different data providers without sacrificing much
data privacy and data utility. In this paper, We develop the Space
Adaptation Protocol (SAP) for securely unifying the perturbations.
SAP enables parties to anonymously submit the perturbed data and
minimizes the risk of privacy breach with low cost.
2. GEOMETRIC DATA PERTURBATION
We define a geometric perturbation as a combination of random
rotation perturbation, random translation perturbation, and noise
addition. It can be represented asG(X) = RX + Ψ + ∆. X de-
notes thenormalizedoriginal dataset withN rows andd columns,
R is ad× d random orthogonal matrix, andΨ is ad×N random
translation matrix [2].Ψ = t × 1′ andt is randomly generated
using the uniform distribution over [-1, 1].∆ is a noise matrix with
i.i.d. (independent identically distributed) elements, which is used
to perturb distances.
In papers [1, 2], we defined two privacy metrics for multi-column
privacy evaluation. In this paper we by default use the “Minimum
Privacy Guarantee” to represent the privacy guarantee ofDPi, de-
noted byρi. ρi is greater than or equal to zero and is bounded by
some value, saybi, which may be different for different datasets.
With the optimization algorithm [2], we can get a higher local
privacy guaranteeρi compared to the randomly generated perturba-
tion as Figure 2 illustrates. Let the mean of optimized privacy guar-
antee bēρi. We use theoptimality rateO to represent the efficiency
of optimization for the particular dataset:Oi = ρ̄ibi . The boundbi
is usually estimated empirically by looking at the maximum pri-
vacy guarantee ofn-round optimizations, i.e.,̂b = max{ρ(i), 1 ≤
i ≤ n}.
The evaluation of multiparty privacy guarantee is thus defined by
two aspects: the risk of data source being identified (source iden-
tifiability) and the reduction of local privacy guarantee by using
unified perturbation. We define the source identifiabilityπi as the
probability that the received data is indeed from the data provider
DPi, denoted byπi = Pr(DPi|Xi). Next, let the locally opti-
mized perturbation give the privacy guarantee ofρi or DPi, and
the global perturbationG gives the privacy guaranteeρGi . We de-
fine thesatisfaction levelfor the unified perturbationG by the data
providerDPi assi =
ρGi
ρi
. Let bi be the upper bound of the mini-
mum privacy guarantee of data providerDPi. We define theRisk
of Privacy Breachfor DPi, denoted byRGi , as follows:
RGi = πi · (bi − siρi)
bi
= πi(1− si · ρi
bi
) (1)
3. SPACE ADAPTATION PROTOCOL
Space adaptation protocol utilizes the concept of space adapta-
tion to support de-identification of data sources. The basic idea
of reducing the identifiability of data sources is to make use of se-
cure random exchange of perturbed datasets between data providers
with the help ofspace adaptation.
Let the perturbation parameters for the data providerDPi are
Gi : (Ri, ti), with a common noise component∆ used by all par-
ties. Let the original sub-dataset beXi andYi be the perturbed
data. Now, suppose that we want to transformYi to Yi→t in the tar-
get spaceGt : (Rt, tt) that hasno noise component. The following
procedure is applied. SinceYi = Gi(Xi) = RiXi +Ψi +∆i, and
thusXi = R−1i (Yi−Ψi−∆i), we can easily prove the following
equation hold:
Yi→t = RtR
−1
i Yi + (Ψt −RtR−1i Ψi)−RtR−1i ∆i
This equation consists of three components. We define the first
componentRtR−1i asthe rotation adaptorRit. RtR
−1
i Ψi is still a
translation matrix, and thus we name the second partΨt−RtR−1i Ψi
as thethe translation adaptorΨit. The third part involves the
original noise component and we name∆it = RtR−1i ∆i as the
complementary noise. It is easy to prove that removing the com-
plementary noise component in the target spaceGt is equivalent
to inheriting the noise component∆i from the original spaceGi.
Therefore, we use< Rit, Ψit > as the space adaptor.
The protocol starts with the random selection of target perturba-
tion, say,Gt : (Rt, tt). Let each data provider,DPi, also have a
locally optimized perturbationGi : (Ri, ti). DPi provides only
the locally optimally perturbed datasetGi(Xi) to other parties.
Next, the coordinator, without loss of generality,DPk, generates
a sequence, which is a random permutation of thek data providers:
(1, . . . , k) ← (τ(1), . . . , τ(k)). LetDPi receive data fromDPτ(i).
However, we do not allow the coordinator to receive any dataset,
since the coordinator will also receive parameters later, which will
help to recover any received perturbation. Therefore, we randomly
redirectτ(k) to anyj, j ∈ 1 . . . k−1, instead. Finally, the mapping
becomes(1, . . . , k − 1, j) ← (τ(1), . . . , τ(k)) j 6= k. Now, each
datasetGi(Xi) has a probability of 1k−1 going to any of thek − 1
data providers. After random exchange, each data provider sends
the received dataset to the data miner. By doing this, the identifi-
ability of data source in the service provider’s view is reduced to
πi =
1
k−1 .
Finally, each data providerDPi sends the space adaptorAit =<
Rit, Ψit > to the coordinator. The coordinator maps the adaptors
to the right target by the permutation sequence,(DP1 : Aτ(1),t,
. . . , DPj : Aτ(j),t, DPj : Aτ(k),t, . . . , DPk−1 :Aτ(k−1),t), and
sends this sequence of space adaptors to the data miner.
Let the unified perturbationGt gives satisfaction levelsi toDPi.
Therefore, the overall risk of privacy breach forDPi, from the view
of both data providers and the data miner, is:
RSAPi = max{ (bi − ρi)
bi
,
(bi − siρi)
bi
× 1
k − 1} (2)
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULT
Twelve UCI machine learning datasets are used in the experi-
ments. Each dataset is split into several randomly sized sub-datasets,
simulating the distributed datasets from the data providers.
Characteristics of SAPFirst of all, we study the relationship
between the factors:k, the number of parties,bi, the upper bound
of possible privacy guarantee forDPi, ρi, the locally optimized
privacy guarantee, ands0i : the satisfaction level that each party
expects. The rateρi
bi
is approximated by the optimality rateρ̄i
b̂i
,
which can be estimated on sample local optimization results. In
experiments, we use the algorithm and attack models discussed in
the paper [2] to study the factorρ̄i
b̂i
. Figure 3 shows the estimated
rates for the three typical datasets in 100 rounds. We choose the
maximum value in the series of experiments for each dataset as the
upper bound. Figure 4 shows the relationship betweenk, s0i and
the optimality rate.
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Effect on Model AccuracyWe finalize the experiments with the
study of model accuracy for two representative classifiers: KNN
classifier and SVM classifier with RBF kernel. Certainly, geometric
perturbation can be applied to much more classifiers as discussed
in previous work [1]. We also study the effect of “partition distribu-
tion” to the model accuracy. A local dataset is treated as a sample of
the pooled dataset. Uniform partition distribution means the local
datasets are almost uniform sample sets of the pooled dataset, while
any skewed partition distribution does not have such property. The
numbers in Figure 5 and 6 show the deviation from the standard
accuracy which is generated on the original unperturbed dataset. A
negative number means that the actual accuracy is reduced.
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Figure 5: The average devi-
ation of model accuracy for
KNN classifier.
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Figure 6: The average devi-
ation of model accuracy for
SVM(RBF) classifier.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed the space adaptation protocol to se-
curely unify multiple geometric perturbations, analyzed the fea-
tures of the protocol, and studied the relationship between the main
factors and tradeoffs theoretically and empirically.
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